The Doomsday Argument (DA) has sparked a variety of opinions. Here I address a key question posed by F. Simpson (2016) that confronts the views of DA proponents and those who, like me, oppose the DA. I agree that typical locations within a complete spatial distribution are calculable using ordinary frequentist probability. But I argue that the temporal probability distribution is unknown: we have records of our past yet are ignorant of our future. It is this asymmetry that upsets the idea of Copernicanism in time. Although frequentist methods do not apply to this asymmetric situation, Bayesian methods do apply. They show that the various Quick Doom and Distant Doom scenarios are equally likely. I conclude that the DA has no predictive power whatsoever.
Introduction
How long into our future will mankind last? The "Doomsday Argument" (Carter 1983 , Gott 1993 , Leslie 1996 , Leslie 2010 is an effort to answer this question quantitatively. The argument is based on the fact that samples from a known distribution are rarely found at its extreme ends. In only 1% of random draws would a sample be found in the distribution's first percentile zone. So, the argument goes, there is only a 1% chance of finding our present human rank number less than 1 × 10 11 if mankind's total span is 1 × 10 13 individuals. Larger spans make this probability even smaller. Since we are all reluctant to accept unlikely situations, we should be reluctant to accept the notion that the total span of humanity will exceed 1 × 10 13 individuals.
I will not attempt to summarize the many discussion points on this topic except to direct the reader to five related discussions (Oliver and Korb 1998 , Monton and Roush 2001 , Northcott 2016 , McCutcheon 2018 , Lampton 2019 . Here I want to focus on question 2 raised by Fergus Simpson (2016) that concisely captures the issue: can probabilistic arguments constrain our future? "Q2. Why would your spatial location relative to other humans appear representative of the parent population, but not your temporal one?"
Spatial Distributions
In Figure 1 , I show the distribution of the world population with respect to latitude. Living in California, I find myself at latitude +37 deg and so I am at about the 60th percentile of latitudes, typically situated among the people of the world: not an extreme outlier. The entire distribution is known: each individual can be located in the chart, according to latitude, with the span −90 deg to +90 deg encompassing the entire human race. Because the distribution is known, frequentist probability applies. I must find myself in one of these one-degree bins, so the sum of my bin probabilities is 1. Figure 1 : World population vs latitude. Green: differential. Blue: cumulative percent.
Temporal Distributions
In Figure 2 , I show the cumulative growth of world population versus time. There is a key difference from the cumulative distribution seen in Figure 1 : here it is plotted as the number of individuals, not as a percentage. It is merely the beginning of an integral, and unlike Figure 1 , it cannot be normalized to 100% because we do not have the future data required to normalize it. 
Conclusion
Returning to Simpson's question 2, how do these cases differ? My reply is that the spatial distribution is known, and my rank within this distribution is in principle measurable. In contrast, the eventual extent of mankind's growth is unknown: we can gather population data from our past but not from our future. Given some evidence, Bayesian logic provides a way to quantitatively compare two alternative hypotheses. In an earlier treatment (Lampton 2019) , I evaluated the relative likelihoods of various Quick Doom and Distant Doom scenarios given the evidence that mankind has, so far, numbered about 1×10 11 individuals. The result is exactly what you would expect: given only past data, those scenarios are equally likely. Given only what we know now, we have no way to decide between them.
